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Abstract:  
This paper is aimed at analysing state aid to the railway sector in the Western countries of the European Union. 
Although this is a preliminary exercise, literature lacks of specificity. From the analysis, a highly differentiated 
situation in Europe emerges: a group of countries with permanently lower subsidies (the Iberians, the 
Scandinavians and Austria); a group of countries with a medium level of subsidies (all of the major countries: 
Germany, France and the UK) and a group of countries with permanently high subsidies (Italy, Denmark, 
Belgium and the Netherlands). This paper demonstrates that railways have so far benefited from weakened forms 
state aid control. This can be motivated (i) by the need for modal rebalance recognised by national transport 
policies, (ii) by the natural monopolistic character of the network whose duplication is not economically feasible 
and (iii) by the non-competitive traditional structure, from a legal point of view, of even the transport service. 
This situation, however, is set to change drastically with the opening up of services to competition, which has 
already been done in the European Union for the freight sector and in some countries, although only on a 
voluntary basis, even for the passenger sector. By focusing on Italy, this study finds that the elevated state aid to 
the rail sector consequently results in both a major public finance problem and a potential factor of competition 
distortion. 
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Introduction 
State aid control should target sustainable growth-enhancing policies while encouraging budgetary 
consolidation, limiting distortions of competition and keeping the single market open. Knipes (2013) 
provides a short outline of the historical roots of the controversial debates on the role of the State and 
the markets, and the organization of competition in European railroad industries. State aid is defined as 
an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public 
authorities. Therefore, subsidies granted to individuals or general measures open to all enterprises are 
not covered by this prohibition and do not constitute State aid. In 2012 The EU Commission has 
proposed a recast of a directive establishing a single European railway area, aiming to increase 
competition in the rail market by improving access to terminals and maintenance facilities and 
strengthening the powers of national rail regulators (Directive 2012/34/EU). Prior research has 
analysed the reforms (Preston, 2009), methods to explore the impact of subsidies on competition 
(Nitsche & Heidhues, 2006), the effectiveness of State aid in increasing the efficiency in railways 
across Europe (Friederiszick, Röller, & Schulz, 2003). A number of reforms have affected the 
European rail market over the last two decades, Preston (2009) reviews what actual changes have 
occurred on the ground over this period. Knipes (2013) evaluates competition on the markets for rail 
services and public subsidies for rail infrastructures as well as subsidies for train services. Szekely 
(2009) sheds a light on the transformation schemes in Europe so that it would be possible for countries 
to set up better policies. EU rules require track access charges to be set on the basis of direct/marginal 
costs – the cost directly incurred as a result of operating a train service. As an exception for specific 
investment projects only, higher charges can be set on the basis of the long-term costs of such projects, 
(Directive 2012/34/EU). 
Literature Review 
The topic of subsidies to European railways has been less investigated because of the disparities in 
management systems, access charge models and ownership of incumbent operators. Also Beria et al., 
(2012) argue that entry in the industry has not yet developed its full potential and highlight that an 
issue emerging in this research is the opposing attitude of incumbent railways against liberalisation 
and the role of governments in backing this behaviour. To this regard, by comparing Sweden, Great 
Britain and Germany, the examination of subsidy levels finds that Germany has the slowest growth in 
public financial support for its railway, as well as the lowest increase in fares (Nash, Nilsson & Link, 
2013) model. Nilsson et al., (2013) describe recent reforms in Sweden, and to address how the reforms 
have handled four critical issues for the success of the reforms: the allocation of infrastructure 
capacity; the provision of maintenance and terminal facilities; the access to rolling stock; and the 
provision of information and ticketing to travellers. Nilsson, J. E. (2002) describes the Swedish 
reorganisation, the subsequent process towards free entry and competition in parts of the sector and the 
consequences of these changes and argues that the policies have been mainly directed towards the 
sector’s inability to recover costs.  
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The European Commission has been exercising and documenting its actions in favour of competition 
and the construction of the internal market for more than forty years. The control of state aid has 
become a key element within these policies to ensure fair competition. Member states sometimes use 
public resources to promote or protect certain economic activities. Despite state aid being prohibited 
by the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, there are certain exceptions that are justified 
by objectives of common interest (European Union, 2013).  
The state aid system has been developed gradually from a situation in which a series of complex 
national regimes existed (Mayhew, 1998). In 1973, the Court of Justice gave the Commission legal 
authority to ask member states, and specifically the recipient companies, to pay back any aid that was 
received unlawfully according to the Treaty (European Commission, 1973). The subsequent decade 
saw the structured application of this principle within an effective and articulated policy framework 
and the 1989 Report on Competition Policy reaffirmed the notion that, although being tolerated in the 
past, state aid would be reviewed in order to evaluate its compatibility with the common market. The 
rules on state aid in Europe are very complex (Friederiszick, et al. 2006). 
One of the consequences of the increased focus on regulation in the field of state aid, is the evolution 
of the aid itself, from being widely distributed to being reduced and allocated strictly since the total 
amount of aid given reduced from 1.2% of EU GDP in 1992 to less than half in 2011 (European 
Commission, 2012), excluding anti-crisis measures. Following the reforms mentioned, national 
competition authorities along with national courts were authorised to apply all EU antitrust rules, 
becoming equivalent to the Commission of the European Competition Network. While the above 
refers to the internal market, it should be emphasized that, since the nineties, the Commission has 
sought to encourage major trading partners to implement similar policies through bilateral 
negotiations. Title XII of the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, Chapter 1 (Competition rules) Section 2, is comprised of Articles 107, 108 and 109 the 
contents of which are of particular interest to this study, TFUE (2008). Specifically, Article 107 states 
that any aid granted by a Member State, namely any State resources in any form, that favours specific 
enterprises or the production of certain goods falsifying or threatening to falsify competition, are 
incompatible with the internal market as they can affect trade between Member States. Article 107 of 
the TFUE provides a general definition of state aid that consists of the four cumulative factors given 
below (European Commission, 2012b): 
- The aid must be granted by the state or through state resources; 
- The aid must confer a selective advantage (i.e. favouring certain enterprises, the production of 
certain goods or the provision of certain services); 
- The aid must lead to a (potential) distortion of competition;  
- The aid must affect trade between Member States. 
The rules on state aid 
2013 European Journal of Business and Economics Vol. 8 (4) pp.1-9 
With regards to state aid in the railway sector, it is evident that even if it assumes a monopolistic 
structure, which is gradually being overcome as a result of the development of the EU community 
rules, it is at least able to confer a selective advantage for rail transport to the detriment of competing 
modes, such as air transport. This aid can be justified, however, as the re-balancing of means of 
transport, dictated by the more favourable environmental impact of rail transport. The risks of 
competition distortion are much more significant when the monopolistic structure of the railway sector 
is overcome as a result of EU rules that are applied to the community as in the case of freight 
transport, or as a result of voluntary choices of the nation. In such cases, aid granted to individual 
railway companies requires deep insight and specific assessment of fairness and proportionality, while 
aid granted to network operators is less problematic, provided that they are adequately separated from 
transport companies and thus unable to offer cross-subsidies. The EEA (2007) attempts to define the 
structure and the amount of subsidies paid to the different modes of transport.  
In the previously outlined general framework, aid of a social nature granted to individual consumers, 
(provided that they are given without discrimination related to the origin of the products), aid to cover 
costs arising from natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, and aid granted to the economy of 
certain regions, are all considered compatible.  
Article 108 outlines that the Commission examines, along with the Member States, the existing aid 
systems in the same Member States. In the event that the Commission finds that aid granted by a State 
is not compatible with the internal market or it has been given unlawfully, it states that the country 
concerned must abolish or change it within the specified period of time. The regulation (EC) no. 
800/2008, lists certain categories of aid that are compatible with the common market, authorising the 
Commission to exclude them from the notification obligation (Zahariadis, 2013). Railways sector aid 
does not fall among those exempt from the notification obligation. The examination of the 
compatibility of aid is carried out in accordance with the objective of common interest at which the aid 
aimed. In principle, when assessing the compatibility of aid, the Commission will apply specific 
criteria defined for each of the categories of aid related to the rail sector, such as, aid related to the 
needs of transport coordination, aid for the restructuring of railway companies, aid for small and 
medium-sized companies, aid for the protection of the environment, aid given to offset the costs of 
certain public service obligations and, in the context of public service contracts, regional aid. In a 
recent article, Wellings (2013) highlights that railway sector aid has risen significantly in recent years 
in several countries, and supports the need for further structural reforms in order to ease the burden for 
taxpayers.  
Following are the criteria used for the evaluation of each typology. Public funding for infrastructure 
development may constitute state aid. According to the Court of Justice, it must be assessed whether 
the provision in favour of the infrastructure is able to generate a reduction in costs that burden the 
balance sheet of railway companies. In order for this to happen, the beneficiary companies must derive 
a selective advantage from the financing of infrastructure. In cases where the use of the infrastructure 
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is open to all potential users in a non-discriminatory way, and the access fee is accounted for 
according to the methods and levels consistent with Community legislation (Directive 2001/14/CE), 
the Commission considers that public financing of infrastructure should not be regarded as state aid. 
The reforms initiated by the Directive 91/440/EEC have three main objectives: build traffic, enhance 
the quality of service and improve economic efficiency; Dehornoy (2011) attempts to assess the third 
objective.The paragraph concerning aid for the purchase and renewal of rolling stock is based on the 
consideration of the type and, in particular in Europe, the age of the fleet that is particularly dated in 
many countries. The Commission has set itself the goal of renewing the rolling stock – quantifiable as 
1% per year – necessary for:  
- The maintenance of the competitiveness of rail transport compared to other modes of 
transport; 
- To reduce the environmental impact of rail transport. 
Therefore, under certain conditions, aid classified as aid for the purchase and renewal of rolling stock, 
is compatible with Community rules on competition. Even if, in terms of regional aid for initial 
investments, expenditure on the purchase of rolling stock in the transport sector is not eligible for aid, 
this rule may be waived in the case of rail passenger transport. This is due to the fact that rolling stock 
in this sector can be permanently assigned to specific lines or services. Therefore, whilst subject to 
certain conditions, expenses for the purchase of rolling stock are deemed eligible for assistance.  
This exemption applies to all types of investment, both for the initial purchase and the replacement of 
the material, provided it is used for services on lines that regularly serve a region that benefits from aid 
under Article 87 of the Treaty, an outermost region or a region with a low population density. Finally, 
if the recipient company is entrusted with the provision of SIEG involving, either or both, the buying 
or renewal of rolling stock and already in receipt of compensation, this must be taken into account 
when granting regional aid to the company, in order to avoid over compensation. After follows the 
cancellation of debt that is based on the historical consideration that railway companies have often 
experienced phases of heavy indebtedness due to investments, a phenomenon that still affects a 
number of network operators. Directive 91/440/CEE addresses this situation and states that the 
Member States must «ensure that existing publicly owned railway companies are given a sound 
financial structure» foreseeing the possibility of «financial restructuring». The Directive also states 
that Member States «establish, together with the existing publicly owned railway companies, 
appropriate mechanisms to help reduce the indebtedness of said companies to a level that does not 
impede sound financial management, and to help recover their financial situation». The same article 
also considers the hypothesis of giving state aid «to cancel the debts of those referred to in the article» 
and says that the granting of such aid must be in compliance with Articles 73, 87 and 88 of the EC 
Treaty. Following this Directive, the restructuring of debts is carried out using different instruments.  
- The transfer of a part or all of the debt to the institution responsible for the management of 
infrastructure; 
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- The creation of separate entities for the financing of infrastructure projects (such as high-speed 
lines); 
- The financial restructuration of railway companies, carried out in particular through the 
cancellation of a part or all of the debt.  
State aid for the restructuring of a freight branch in economic difficulty is a special case, of minor 
interest for this paper. Generally, compatibility is assessed based on the 2004 guidelines in force on 
aid for restructuration, which do not foresee exemptions for railway companies. Additionally, 
restructuration aid is usually intended for economic entities with a legal personality, while railway 
companies do not normally separate the freight transport branch from the passenger branch. Aid 
requested for transport coordination needs is considered compatible with the Treaty provided that it 
does not harm the general interests of the Community. The term ‘transport coordination’ does not 
mean merely facilitating development, but specifically intervening to guide the evolution of the 
transport sector in the interests of the public. However, following the pro liberalisation measures, the 
need for coordination has lessened. In fact, in a liberalised and efficient market, coordination is carried 
out by the operators. Despite this, in many cases investments for the development of infrastructure 
continue to be given by the public sector and, even after liberalisation, there may be failures – e.g. 
diseconomies of scale and negative externalities like traffic or pollution – that justify state 
intervention. Finally, the Communication by the Commission on the application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the Treaty to state aid given in the form of guarantees, defines the rules applicable to guarantees 
from the state in the rail transport sector. The communication of the Commission (GU C 71 of the 
11.3.2000, p.14) states: «The Commission also considers preferential funding terms obtained by 
enterprises whose legal form excludes bankruptcy and other insolvency procedures or explicitly 
foresees the granting of state guarantees or the coverage of losses by the state, as state aid granted in 
the form of guarantees». In general, guarantees granted in relatively competitive sectors are 
incompatible with the EC Treaty. These guarantees represent effective aid and the interested Member 
States have to tell the Commission how they will grant this type of aid and the measures that they 
intend to take to remove it.  
Dimensions and trends of state aid in the EU and Italy 
 
Over a long period of time, the three decades since the eighties until today, the level of state aid in the 
European economies shows a clear downward trend. In fact, in the eighties, the total GDP share of the 
European Union amounted to around 2%, in the following decade it reduced to 1% before stabilising 
at levels ranging between 0.5 and 0.6% in recent years. In 2011, the latest year available (This paper is 
based on data available up to November 2013), EU states guaranteed financial coverage of just less 
than 64,3 billion Euros (the previous year was 74 billion Euros) of aid, classed as aid not related to 
crisis situations (non-crisis aid), equal to approximately 0.5% of European GDP. This data however, 
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which can be distinguished based on the recipient sector (manufacturing, financial and non-financial 
services, agriculture, fisheries and transport companies), excludes rail transport aid, a sector that seems 
to benefit from a special regime even from a statistical point of view. In fact, while data on all other 
sectors is regularly updated and offers complete coverage, in the railway sector, there are many 
shortcomings and delays in reporting, and consequently (as you will see in the second part of this 
paper) the data cannot be integrated with that of others without altering its completeness and 
significance. For these reasons, the data is traditionally accounted for and published by the 
Commission separately.  
In 2011, state aid for the railway sector submitted to the Commission amounted to 30.7 billion, 
however state aid granted by the states that had not yet been communicated needed to be added, 
estimated at just under 17 billion. Thus, the total amount of aid granted to the railway sector was more 
than 47 billion, and the total general state aid in Europe more than 111 billion. Of these, the sector that 
benefits from most aid, excluding railways, is that of manufacturing, with 39 billion and 33% of the 
total (Figure 1). The aid given to railways that was regularly reported represents 28% of the total, a 
figure that rises to 43% if we include the estimation for non-notified aid. The rail sector is therefore 
the number one beneficiary of state aid in the EU. 
A second consideration is the fact that railway aid, as a share of GDP, does not appear to have reduced 
sharply over time unlike it has for state aid in all other sectors. As Figure 2 illustrates, aid has gone 
from 1.2% of GDP at the beginning of the 90s to 0.5% in 2011. As for aid given to the railway sector 
however, the decline was much less pronounced and was only seen in the 90s: from 0.5% of GDP in 
1992 to just under 0.4% in the early 2000s. For the rest of the decade, the share instead remained 
stationary, except for its growth in the recession perhaps demonstrating a substantial inability to 
reduce public railway expenditure.  
Figure 1: State aid in the European Union per recepient sector (2011) 
 
Source: Authors 
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*In % of total with the exception of 'crisis-aid 
 
The different dynamic of state aid in the railway sector compared to other sectors in the EU is made 
particularly evident by the different inclination of the two trend lines drawn in Figure 2 in relation to 
the two variables. They highlight a convergence between the two values, with subsidies to rail 
transport supposedly destined, in the absence of interventions, to overtake all of the rest in a few years. 
Figure 1: State aid in the European Union (1990-2011), % of GDP 
 
Source: Based on data from the EU Commission 
 
 
The previous analysis on the trends of EU state aid to the rail sector compared to the other sectors 
produces equivalent, if not more, interesting results when looking at Italy. In this case, it is necessary 
to point out that while it was easy to reconstruct absolute values of Italian aid excluding the rail sector 
and its weight on GDP, not much more can be said for this sector before the year 2000. 
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
All sectors without railways Railways
2013 European Journal of Business and Economics Vol. 8 (4) pp.1-9 
Figure 3: State aid in the EU and Italy, excluding the railway sector (1990-2011) 
 
Source: Based on data from the EU Commission 
 
Figure 3 shows the fastest reduction path regarding state aid excluding the rail sector in Italy compared 
to the EU: at the beginning of 90s, its weight on GDP was almost double compared to that of the 
European Union, but throughout the course of the decade, probably as a result of the public finance 
constraints that affected our country, it reduced by around three-quarters bringing it below the EU 
average. In 2011, it represented less than a quarter of a point of GDP, half compared to the entire EU.  
This virtuous path of reduction has not yet extended to state aid for the Italian rail sector. As verified 
by Figure 4, there was a reduction in aid as a share of GDP in the second half of the 90s, but this was 
recuperated in early 2000. Additionally, from 2007 onwards, aid for railways was steadily more 
consistent compared to the total aid granted to all other economic sectors. This distinctive 
characteristic of the situation in Italy is illustrated by Arrigo & Di Foggia (2013), which highlight that 
almost 60% of the total state aid granted in our country in 2010, amounting to just under 10.5 billion 
euros, was given to the rail sector. It therefore seems necessary to try to identify which dimensional 
factors of rail transport or specific objectives of transport policy justify such a consistent and stable 
financial commitment for public coffers.  
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Figure 4: State aid in Italy (1994-2011) - Figures in % of GDP 
 
Source: Based on data from the EU Commission 
State aid for the railway sector in individual EU countries  
After having given an overview of the institutional framework for the regulation of state aid to the 
railway sector in the European Union and the general dimensions of the phenomenon, we will now 
look in depth at each of the individual countries in an attempt to identify benchmarks with which to 
compare the Italian situation. The EU Commission annually renews a summary table, the latest 
version of which can be seen in Table 1, showing the total aid for each country, as reported by the 
states, that are awarded to the actors of rail transport: network operators and transport operators. 
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Table 1: State aid to the rail sector in the EU-27, 2000-2011, in millions of €. 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU-27 - - - - - - 42807 46345 43866 46216 38320 30674 
Austria 649 649 664 647 632 533 637 636 1900 1593 1537 0 
Bulgaria - - - - - - 61 102 121 155 168 173 
Belgium 2.164 2.205 2.278 2.412 2.057 3.129 3.226 2.588 2.666 2.462 2.929 3.239 
Czech Rep. - - - 239 239 264 270 317 407 499 0 0 
Denmark 672 731 714 813 813 916 891 9.45 1.125 1.140 1.195 1.281 
Germany 9.308 9.385 9.515 9.144 8.239 8.114 8.001 8.435 13.234 13.485 9.390 9.496 
Estonia - - - 12 12 12 12 14 16 17 421 18 
Greece 446 625 552 636 329 257 275 397 397 549 536 436 
Spain 1.350 1.349 1.346 1.338 1.370 455 563 1.009 1.019 970 800 0 
Finland 403 359 412 489 562 516 467 461 521 500 99 103 
France 6.482 8.770 9.132 7.921 9.120 9.912 10.100 9.695 10.326 10.895 10.769 12.043 
Ireland 373 440 491 544 416 576 603 797 728 613 587 400 
Italy 6.246 6.839 7.236 6.006 5.699 6.040 5.126 8.320   8.104 6.125 0 
Latvia - - - 3 15 23 31 37 50 41 37 31 
Lithuania - - - 0 5 6 3 6 9 2 3 3 
Luxemburg 208 255 264 293 310 315 394 418 411 281 290 0 
Hungary - - - 451 411 439 530 810 815 708 728 745 
Netherlands 2.051 2.686 2.946 3.322 2.936 2.686 2.719 2.210 1.943 1.883 0 0 
Poland - - - 104 172 184 310 341 277 340 417 438 
Portugal 16 22 25 58 56 64 74 80 84 91 93 0 
Romania - - - - - - 3 11 553 445 543 525 
Slovenia - - - 125 331 176 186 148 153 42 49 48 
Slovakia - - - 0 165 218 223 266 286   0 0 
Sweden 851 852 892 1.003 1.167 1.271 1.415 1.653 1.113 1.401 1.604 1.695 
UK 2.061 6.817 4.261 4.002 5371 6.592 6.689 6.650 5.712   0 0 
 
Source: DG MOVE 
 
Considering the table 1. One shall note that data for EU-10 Member States are included from 2003 
onwards, for Bulgaria and Romania from 2006. Includes all public subsidies communicated to the 
Commission as well as subsidies that have been notified and authorized by the Commission under 
relevant State aid rules. The figures exclude compensation for services of general economic interest. 
EU- 27: Represents all Member States, which the calculation includes as of the year when data were 
available. SK: DG TREN estimates for 2008; UK: DG TREN estimates for 2006, 2007 and 2008.  
In the above table, the EU Commission includes aid communicated by the states that are obliged to do 
so according to the European Treaties as members of the union (therefore where indicated in the table, 
the zero value means that they did not communicate aid and not that the aid amounted to nothing). The 
most recently joined members are thus included only after their admission to the Union, and the data 
for previous years are not reported as there were no notification requirements. As a result, the data 
relative to the total EU-27 is only shown as of 2006, the year in which a total of 42.8 billion Euros of 
aid were distributed in the 25 countries (Cyprus and Malta do not have railways), while in the 
following year, 2007, this figure grew to 46.3 billion Euros. In 2008, this figure seemingly reduced to 
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43.9 billion, however the table highlights an absence of notification of state aid by Italy. Considering 
that the total amounts both in the previous and following years were around 8 billion Euros, we can 
estimate that the total payments of the 25 countries in that year amounted to around 52 billion.  
In the following year, 2009, total state aid shown in the table was 46.2 billion, however the 
notifications of Great Britain and Slovakia are missing. Considering their total amounts, amounting to 
6 billion for both countries together, we can estimate that, similarly, in this year total payment 
exceeded 52 billion. In 2010, the official total is 38.3 billion, however, the number of states that did 
not submit their notifications increased, now including the Netherlands and the Czech Republic as well 
as the UK and Slovakia. The estimated total for these four countries is 8.5 billion, bringing the total to 
just under 47 billion, a sharp reduction compared to the previous year.  
 
Finally, in 2011, the latest year available, the official total amounted to 30.7 billion, however this is 
not very reliable due to the number of states not submitting notifications increasing to nine. 
Altogether, it can be estimated that the missing amount is around 17 billion, bringing the Union total 
to around 47-48 billion euros, probably higher than the previous year. Over the six-year period, 2006-
11, total state aid in the Union is estimated at a little less than 290 billion, corresponding to an annual 
average of around 48 billion.  
State aid to the railway sector in the EU pre-enlargement 
The previous data, despite being incomplete, is very interesting and can be assessed for individual 
countries in comparison to the size of the national rail networks, the number of trains in circulation 
and the number of passengers and goods carried. Before proceeding with this analysis however, the 10 
countries that have recently joined the EU should be excluded, both for their incomplete data over time 
and for their railway sectors being characterised differently from those of Western European 
Countries. Luxembourg, Ireland and Greece should also be excluded due to their small geographical 
size and limited rail networks. 
For the remaining 12 countries that we will analyse, it should be noted that in 2011, half of them did 
not submit notifications for state aid. As a result, it is not possible to accurately reconstruct the missing 
values, and therefore, pending further updates from the EU Commission, the analysis is limited to the 
data from 2010.  
 
Table 2: State aid to the rail sector in the EU-12, 2000-2010, in millions of €. 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TOTA
L 
EU-12 
32.25
4 
40.66
4 
39.42
1 
37.15
5 
38.02
1 
40.22
8 
39.90
6 
42.68
1 
47.34
0 
47.73
1 
40.97
5 446.377 
2013 European Journal of Business and Economics Vol. 8 (4) pp.1-9 
Austria 649 649 664 647 632 533 637 636 1900 1593 1537 10.076 
Belgium 2.164 2.205 2.278 2.412 2.057 3.129 3.226 2.588 2.666 2.462 2.929 28.115 
Denmark 672 731 714 813 813 916 891 945 1.125 1.140 1.195 9956 
Germany 9.308 9.385 9.515 9.144 8.239 8.114 8.001 8.435 
13.23
4 
13.48
5 9.390 106.250 
Spain 1.350 1.349 1.346 1.338 1.370 455 563 1.009 1.019 970 800 11.568 
Finland 403 359 412 489 562 516 467 461 521 500 99 4.789 
France 6.482 8.770 9.132 7.921 9.120 9.912 
10.10
0 9.695 
10.32
6 
10.89
5 
10.76
9 103.121 
Italy 6.246 6.839 7.236 6.006 5.699 6.040 5.126 8.320 7.697 8.104 6.125 73.438 
Netherland
s 2.051 2.686 2.946 3.322 2.936 2.686 2719 2.210 1.943 1.883 1.794 27.176 
Portugal 16 22 25 58 56 64 74 80 84 91 93 664 
Sweden 851 852 892 1.003 1.167 1.271 1.415 1.653 1.113 1.401 1.604 13.222 
UK 2.061 6.817 4.261 4.002 5.371 6.592 6.689 6.650 5.712 5.207 4.640 58.003 
 
Source: DG MOVE 
 
The data contained in table 2 with a grey background have been estimated based on figures from 
regulators or the recipient national companies. The data used is show in Table 2. In this table, four 
values not reported by the states were estimated on the basis of information available from national 
regulators or financial statements of the entities concerned. For Italy, the 2008 data includes only the 
payments to companies of the FS group in that year, derived from company accounts. The result given, 
therefore, is underestimated as it does not include state aid given to minor railway companies and any 
transfers made to the FS group in 2008 pertaining to different financial years and consequently not 
reported in the financial accounts. As shown in Table 2, in the 11 years considered, the 12 EU 
countries have received a total of 446 billion in state aid, equivalent to a 40.6 billion annual average. 
The country with the largest amount of subsidies is Germany, with 106 billion in total for this period, 
followed by France with 103 billion and Italy with 73 billion. In Italy, however, the 13.1 billion of 
debt until 2006 for the construction of high-speed lines, borne by the Treasury, was not notified. 
Considering this considerable figure, Italy’s total rises to nearly 87 billion over the period. Countries 
with sizable networks that have carried out important processes of market liberalisation are far apart in 
the total ranking of state aid: Great Britain with 58 billion and Sweden with only 13 billion. 
It is evident that in order to assess the importance of state aid to the railway sector in the different 
countries, their annual amounts should be compared to the size of the national networks and its traffic. 
Italy and Great Britain, for example, have similar networks in terms of lengths (between 16 and 17 
thousand kilometres) and very different subsidies; Germany and France have recorded much larger 
amounts of aid in absolute value than both Italy and the United Kingdom, but have roughly double the 
networks: 34 thousand km in Germany and 30 thousand km in France. Finally, Spain and Sweden 
have much lower amounts of aid in absolute value, despite having relatively large networks: 14 
thousand km in Spain and 11 thousand km in Sweden. This simple exercise does not seem, however, 
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to have so far been carried out systematically, probably due to difficulty at a Community level in 
obtaining complete and consistent data on the size and characteristics of the national rail networks and 
associated traffic.  
State aid in relation to the size of the rail sector 
For the different countries included in the study, an analysis on state aid to the sector in relation to 
different dimension aspects is needed: (i) the total length of the network; (ii) the total length of the 
track, these two measures are justified by the fact that subsidies are mostly given to the networks; (iii) 
train km circulating on the network (variable as data for a larger number of countries is missing); (iv) 
total traffic (represented by traffic units that are conventionally given by passenger km plus tonne km 
of goods). In order to carry out this analysis, the length of the networks and tracks in the 12 countries 
have been verified by combining data available from Eurostat, the EU Commission and the UIC and 
verifying it with that of individual network operators where discrepancies or uncertainties were 
present.  
The following graphs show these relationships for each of the 12 countries considered and for the 11 
countries together with the exclusion of Italy. In relation to the extension of the network, the average 
annual state aid for the past four years (2007-10) has amounted to 457 thousand Euros per km of line 
in Italy compared to an average value for all of the other countries of 291 thousand Euros (Figure 5). 
The largest value for Italy compared to that given is 57%. Other major countries in the EU other than 
Italy (UK, FR, DE) recorded significantly lower values than outs between 330 and 350 thousand Euros 
per year per km of line; finally, greatly reduced, are the values of Sweden, 130 thousand Euros, and 
Spain, 71 thousand. 
Figure 5: Annual state aid per km of network (Average value for the period 2007-2010 - Th. euros) 
 
Source: Based on data from the EU Commission 
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Since this data for Italy may be influenced in an anomalous way by the cost of the completion of high-
speed lines (even if the assumption of 13 million Euros of debt until 2006 for the AV were not 
included), we redid the exercise for the entire 2001-2010 period, which shows that the average annual 
aid per km of network over the 11 years was 411 thousand Euros in Italy compared to an average 
value for the other 11 countries of 265 thousand Euros (Table 3). The highest value for Italy is 55%, 
thus almost identical to that of the most recent four years. All of the other countries total values are 
significantly less than ours: France and the UK around 320, Germany 280, Sweden 110 and Finland 
and Spain 70-80 thousand.  
 
Table 2: State aid to the railway sector per km of network, 2000-2010, in €/1000 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 
EU-11 201 262 249 240 253 270 273 268 310 311 273 265 
Belgium 624 638 647 685 582 883 906 725 759 688 818 723 
Denmark 241 262 256 292 307 346 337 357 425 431 452 337 
Germany 254 261 266 254 237 237 234 249 391 400 279 278 
Spain 110 110 109 106 107 35 43 75 76 73 58 82 
France 221 298 311 271 312 338 343 324 345 364 361 317 
Italy 391 426 453 376 358 372 315 509 466 486 367 411 
Netherlands 732 956 1.050 1.182 1.045 960 971 765 671 652 622 873 
Austria 114 114 115 112 111 94 109 109 335 297 305 165 
Portugal 6 8 9 21 20 23 26 28 30 32 33 21 
Finland 69 61 70 84 98 90 79 78 88 84 17 74 
Sweden 77 77 80 91 106 115 128 151 101 126 144 109 
UK 121 400 250 235 325 407 413 410 352 322 287 320 
 
Source: Authors and DG MOVE (for aid), EUROSTAT and UIC (for network lengths).  
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Figure 6: State aid per year per km of track (Average value for the 2007-2010 period - th. euros) 
 
Source: Based on data from DG MOVE, EUROSTAT and UIC. 
 
A refinement of the previous analysis is relating the annual subsidies to the railway sector not in terms 
of network km, but in terms of track km, a relationship that can be considered more accurate than 
previous years (given the apparent correlation between management and construction costs and track 
lengths) and one that is able to avoid distortions in favour of countries that have a number of single-
track lines that is lower than average (e.g. Sweden and Finland) and to the detriment of countries that 
have a number that is above-average (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands). In relation to km of track, the 
average yearly subsidy in the last four years in Italy was 317 thousand Euros compared to an average 
total of 167 thousand for the other 11 countries (Figure 6). Italy consequently results as 90% higher. 
Even in this case all of the other major EU countries have significantly lower values than that of Italy: 
France around 210, the UK 180, Germany 160 and Sweden 90. The final analysis, in not having 
enough statistical data in relation to annual train km circulating on the networks, we will examine 
subsidies in relation to the total traffic of passengers and goods measured by the units of traffic 
(conventionally given by passenger km plus tonne km of goods transported). Over the four-year period 
considered, the average annual subsidy per unit of traffic in Italy was 10.8 cents compared to an 
average value of the other 11 countries of 6.8 cents (Figure 7). In this case, the aid given to Italy is 
59% higher than the European average. The other three major countries (UK, FR, DE) reported values 
between 5.9 and 8.6 cents per km, Sweden only 4.3 cents. 
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Figure 7: State aid per year per unit of traffic (passenger km + tonne km of goods) (Average value for 
the period 2007-2010 in cents) 
 
Source: Based on data from DG MOVE, EUROSTAT and UIC. 
 
In summarising the results of the previous analyses, we can see that the subsidies given to the rail 
sector in Italy fall into the average of the previous four years for which data regarding state aid given 
by the EU countries is available (2007-2010): 
- 55% higher than the average of the other 11 countries of Western Europe in relation to the 
length of the national railway network (km of line); 
- 90% higher in relation to the length of the track of the national network; 
- 59% higher in relation to the units of traffic, passenger and freight, transported on the 
network. 
The average of the three values, equal to 68%, may be used as a summary measure of the excess 
public subsidies paid to the Italian railway system compared to the EU average. In essence, compared 
to the average behaviour of the other states concerned, around three-fifths of the subsidies granted in 
Italy were equally distributed, while the remaining two-fifths would remain in public coffers. This 
proportion, derived from the experience of the four most recent years, can be reasonably extended to 
the whole period taken into consideration.  
The effects of excess subsidies on Italian public finance 
Since Italian public finance granted the rail sector, according to the results of the EU Commission, 
73.4 billion Euros between 2001 and 2010, rising to 86.5 billion Euros if we include the debt for the 
construction of the high speed lines transferred to the Treasury as of 2007, around 35 billion would 
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not have been awarded if these choices were made in line with others made in Europe. The public 
sector would have not only saved this 35 billion Euros in state aid, but it would also have spent less in 
interest on the public debt as a result of borrowing a lower sum to finance railway expenditure.  
The costs accumulated by Italian public finance deriving from excess state aid, compared to the 
European average, given to the Italian railway sector between 2000 and 2010 are shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Cumulative burden of public finances in Italy as a result of excessive state aid (Mil. euros) 
 
Source: Authors, DG MOVE (state aid) and Bank of Italiy (average cost of public debt) 
 
As can be observed, to the 35 billion of excess transferred between 2000 and 2010, emerging for this 
study, an additional 15 billion Euros must be added for financial expenses accrued for interest on the 
public debt, estimated by assuming that the excess transfers to the rail sector were financed by the 
Treasury every year through borrowing and that annual interests paid on this borrowing is equal to the 
average cost of the public debt, calculated as the ratio between annual interest expenditure and the 
average debt stock over twelve months. This leads to a total estimated cost of just under 50 billion for 
Italian public finance. However, this amount is considered underestimated, as it does not include 
transfers to the rail sector in the three years between 2011-2013, since it was not notified according in 
accordance with the periodic statistics on state aid published by the EU Commission. Considering a 
rough estimate of the latter, the magnitude of the excess rail expenditure in Italy would increase to 
around 60 billion in total for the 2000-2013 period.  
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This study represents a first attempt at analysing state aid to the railway sector in the Western 
countries of the European Union, carried out with the aim of assessing the dimensions of aid in 
relation to the main size variables of the sector, such as the lengths of the networks and tracks and total 
passenger and freight traffic transported. Although this is a very simple and preliminary exercise 
compared to a more complex analysis, it would seem that it has never been done before, probably due 
to the absence, on a Community level, of comprehensive and reliable data on the length and other 
features of national rail networks (the information and data on the Eurostat database are incomplete 
and inconsistent). From the analysis, a highly differentiated situation in Europe emerges: (i) a group of 
countries with permanently lower subsidies (the Iberians, the Scandinavians and Austria); (ii) a group 
of countries with a medium level of subsidies (all of the major countries: Germany, France and the 
UK); (iii) a group of countries with permanently high subsidies (Italy, Denmark, Belgium and the 
Netherlands). These differences cannot be explained by analysing the relevant differences in network 
characteristics or levels of transport and therefore require important in-depth study in the future.  
Over the last twenty years, the EU Commission has paid a lot of attention to the monitoring and 
comparison of state aid in many sectors of the economy, however, rail transport seems to represent a 
relevant exception, despite having been the major beneficiary of the aid in recent years, with a share 
higher than 40% of its total value in the Union, excluding those related to the economic crisis (and 
equal to nearly 60% in Italy). A consequence of the limited attention paid to state aid to the rail sector 
is that it is stationary over time in relation to EU GDP, contrasting with the tendency to lower it, which 
has instead occurred in all of the other remaining sectors and led to its reduction by half (and reduced 
to a quarter in Italy) in relation to GDP since the Commission began its systematic monitoring at the 
start of the 90s.  
The idea that emerges from the reading of the specific rules and guidelines for the assessment of state 
aid to the rail sector, together with the severity demonstrated for other sectors and for different types 
of transport, for example aviation, is that rail transport has so far benefited from weakened forms of 
application that appear to be motivated: (i) partly by the need for modal rebalance recognised by 
national transport policies; (ii) partly by the natural monopolistic character of the network whose 
duplication is not economically feasible and thus does not adversely affect competition, at least 
intermodal, public financial support for construction, maintenance and exercise of the network; (iii) 
finally, by the non-competitive traditional structure, from a legal point of view, of even the transport 
service. This situation, however, is set to change drastically with the opening up of services to 
competition, which has already been done in the European Union for the freight sector and in some 
countries, although only on a voluntary basis, even for the passenger sector. Today, aid consequently 
risks being distortive in those countries that have chosen to spontaneously bring forward liberalisation 
of the national passenger transport sector, however, like Italy, they have failed to remove the high 
levels of subsidies or at least make their allocation means non-distortive.  
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One gets the impression that the Commission’s approach has not yet been able to take these changes 
into account and that it is running the risk, in not opposing the aid as in the absence of competition it is 
not distortive, that potential competition is not able to occur due to state aid not being thwarted. The 
question that emerges is: “In the past, there was no competition in the rail transport sector as it was 
against the law, and as a result, state aid to the rail transport sector could not be harmful. Now that, 
at least in some states, the possibility of competition has been legally introduced, does state aid 
continue to not be detrimental as there is no competition at all? Or is there no competition because 
state aid given impedes its manifestation and it is therefore the aid that is detrimental?”. 
This can be, for example, the case in Italy, a country in which according to this study state aid to the 
railway sector has resulted on average, over the most recent four years of data available (2007-2010), 
55% higher than the average of the other 11 Western European countries with regards to network 
length, 90% with regards to the length of the track and 59% with regards to the units of traffic, 
passengers and goods, transported. The average of these three values, equal to 68%, can be used as a 
summary measure of the excess aid to the rail transport sector compared to the European average. In 
monetary terms, this illustrates an excess of 35 billion Euros in public transfers in the 2000-2010 
period, which highlighted an overall cost for public finance of around 50 billion Euros if we add the 
interest charges accrued as a result of financing the aid with public debt.  
The elevated state aid to the rail sector consequently results in both a major public finance problem 
and a potential factor of competition distortion in markets such as Italy that have already been legally 
opened. 
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